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CENTRAL PLANNING STAFF

PLANNING DIRECTIVE NO. 40

6 June 1946

SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare

1. The Problem:

a. The Secretary, NIA, forwarded to the Central Planning Staff at the suggestion of the Chief of Operational Services one copy of a "Report on Psychological Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area 1944-1945." [REDACTED] recommended that the report be used with a view to investigating the advisability of future planning for psychological warfare.

b. The report and forwarding papers are attached to the original of this Directive for use and filing by the Support Branch.

2. Discussion:

a. Colonel Fellers of GHQ, USAFPAC, in forwarding the subject report, stated that in his opinion "psychological warfare is an essential implementation of military intelligence and must be studied thoroughly in peace time. -- It would be criminal neglect not to be prepared to exploit this field."

b. The report of the General Board, USFET, on "Psychological Warfare in the European Theater of Operations" states "even now no fixed place for psychological warfare in the Staff has been determined, ---." It states further "the nature of psychological warfare is political as well as military, and any decisions and directives could only be obtained through agencies representing the State Department of the United States or the foreign office of the United Kingdom; psychological warfare required liaison with the secret services agency of a quasi-military nature; with Allied government in exile; and with civilian commercial services." This report is available in the Policy and Review Branch reference file.

c. The psychological warfare organizations in both the European and Pacific theatres were not an integral part of the Intelligence Division. In both cases they were handled as a special staff function with close coordination with the Intelligence Division.

d. Army Regulation 10-15, subparagraph 8c (9) states "The Military Intelligence Division is specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of -- (9) Army contribution to psychological warfare."

e. It is apparent that:

- (1) Psychological warfare continuity should be insured by coordinated study and planning in peacetime.

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- (2) The State Department, as well as the War and Navy Departments, should be considered in any such planning.
- (3) Psychological warfare is dependent in great measure on intelligence for its operations.
- (4) The responsibility for the psychological warfare function is not well defined.

3. Planning Requirements:

- a. The Support Branch will undertake the study of this problem and will submit its recommendations in duplicate to the Chief, Central Planning Staff, and in one copy to the Policy and Review Branch.
- b. Throughout this study, the Support Branch will consult as required with the other Branches of the Central Planning Staff, which will give appropriate assistance.
- c. In the study of this problem the following points will be considered:
 - (1) What is the relationship of psychological warfare to the intelligence function?
 - (2) What agencies in the several departments should be responsible for the planning in this matter during peacetime?
 - (3) What coordination is required and how should it be handled?
 - (4) What further action, if any, is required of the CIG?

4. Deadline:

An informal progress report will be submitted on 2 July.

FOR THE ACTING CHIEF, CENTRAL PLANNING STAFF:

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[REDACTED]
Acting Deputy Chief, Central Planning Staff

1 Encl:

DF to CPS from Sec, NIA, dtd 5/27, w/1 encl - DF from [REDACTED] to the Director, enclosing Report on Psychological Warfare in SW Pacific Area, 44-45. (with original only - to Support Branch).

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DISTRIBUTION:

For Action:

Support Branch

For Information:

Director of C. I. (Sec, NIA)

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File - Psychological Warfare
File - Planning Directive 40
Suspense - 2 July

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